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Abstract 
 This paper analyzes forward-looking rules for Swiss monetary policy in a small structural VAR model 
consisting of four variables taking into account data revisions for GDP. First, the paper develops an analytical 
method to analyze the effect of data revision errors in GDP on the ex ante or conditional inflation-output-growth 
volatility trade-off and applies it to Swiss data. Second, the effects of different targets in a forward-looking 
monetary policy on ex post or unconditional volatility of inflation and output growth is explored by a simulation 
exercise. In general, the results obtained suggest that focusing monetary policy on GDP growth instead on 
inflation may lead to an inefficient policy with both increased medium term inflation and GDP growth volatility 
in the presence of GDP data revisions.    
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1. Introduction 
After 25 years of monetary targeting, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) adopted a new 
monetary policy framework at the end of 1999. Severe shocks to the demand for central bank 
money, especially for large denominated bank notes and for reserves held by commercial 
banks at the SNB, rendered it impossible to use the medium-term target path for the 
seasonally adjusted monetary base as a guideline for monetary decisions. Thus, the SNB 
decided to abandon monetary targeting. The new framework consists of three elements. The 
first element is an explicit definition of price stability. The SNB regards price stability as 
achieved if CPI inflation is below 2 percent. The second element consists of the use of an 
inflation forecast as the main indicator to guide monetary policy decisions. The third element 
is a target range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor as an operational target to implement 
monetary policy. As in the old concept, maintaining price stability over the medium term 
remains the main objective of monetary policy also in the new framework. 
In the new framework, the inflation forecast serves as the main indicator for guiding 
policy decisions. Although there is no mechanical reaction to the inflation forecast and the 
inflation forecast is not treated as an intermediate target, the discussion at the board about 
monetary policy is focused on the inflation forecast. The forecast used in the decision-making 
process is a consensus forecast that is derived from a series of models and indicators. The 
SNB recently started to publish studies regarding these models. Jordan and Peytrignet (2001) 
delivered an introduction to the inflation forecast of the SNB and the models used to derive it. 
Stalder (2001) presented the large traditional structural macro model of the SNB and Jordan, 
Kugler, Lenz and Savioz (2002) provided an overview over the different VAR approaches 
used at the SNB. 
For the purpose of analyzing forward-looking policies, a small structural VAR 
consisting of four variables was developed by Kugler and Jordan (2004) and Kugler and Rich 
(2002). This research was extended by Kugler, Jordan, Lenz and Savioz (2005) who 
developed an analytical method to analyze the ex ante or conditional medium-term inflation-
output-growth volatility trade-off for a forward-looking policy aiming at a convex 
combination of a medium term inflation and an output growth target in a SVAR model. This 
paper extends this framework with two respects. First, it considers the effects of data revisions 
errors in GDP on the ex ante or conditional medium-term inflation-output-growth volatility 
trade-off. Second, the effects of different targets in a forward-looking monetary policy on ex 
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post or unconditional volatility of inflation and output growth is explored by a simulation 
exercise.  
The brief outline of the aims of the paper at hand clearly indicates that it is related to a 
growing literature on the effects of uncertainty about potential output and the output gap on 
the performance of monetary policy rules. Orphanides (2000, 2001) was one of the first who 
considered this question using real time data for US output gap. He concluded that data 
revision errors in the output gap were of crucial importance for the over-expansionary US 
monetary policy in the sixties and seventies and that neglecting such data revision errors leads 
in general to a too activist policy. However, Svensson and Woodford (2000) argue that this 
result is mainly caused by the fact that in Orphanides’ framework the central bank behaves as 
if there were no data revision errors and that it disappears when the optimal policy rule is a 
function of the best estimate of the state variables, in particular of the output gap. 
Nevertheless the presence of uncertainty with respect to potential output results, of course, in 
welfare losses and has effects on simple Taylor-like rules in standard macroeconomic models 
(Smets, 2002). Extensions and quantitative illustrations of these results are found in Ehrmann 
and Smets (2003) who build a small stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous 
persistence calibrated to the euro area. Briefly their exercise indicates that the data revision 
problem leads to substantial welfare losses mainly in the form of high output gap variability. 
Moreover, simple Taylor rules appear to work well when an optimal output gap estimate is 
used and potential output uncertainty favors the appointment of a conservative (in the sense of 
Rogoff (1985)) central banker.    
This paper differs from the literature sketched above in the following way. First, we do 
not consider uncertainty with respect to the output gap or potential output but only with 
respect to GDP, which is by itself already large as result of strong revisions of the quarterly 
national accounts. Note also that we do not face the problem of obtaining a best estimate of an 
unobservable variable such as the output gap since only GDP growth is considered in our 
model. This approach can be seen as a way to circumvent the problem of measuring the level 
of potential output as recommended among others by Orphanides (2000). Second, we do not 
consider an explicit structural model of the economy, but our analysis is based on the impulse 
response we estimated using a SVAR model. Third, the policy makers do not account for the 
uncertainty with respect to the real time GDP figures. Thus we proceed on the assumption that 
the first release quarterly GDP figure is the best estimated available at the time when the 
policy decision is taken.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the  
SVAR model for the analysis of Swiss monetary policy and gives a short account how the 
inflation-growth trade-off is determined in the absence of GDP data revision errors. Data 
revision errors are taken into account in Section 3. Section 4 considers the effects of non-
equilibrium initial conditions and policy dynamics and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A SVAR Analysis of Swiss Monetary Policy 
In this section, we give a brief account of the framework used for policy analysis in 
order to obtain the inflation GDP growth volatility trade off. The VAR model includes a 
vector of changes )log),/log(,,log(' tttttt ppmryX ∆∆∆∆= where y is GDP in 1990 
Swiss francs, p denotes the consumer price index, m the money stock M1 and r the quarterly 
average of the three-month Swiss-franc Libor rate of interest. In order to keep the model as 
lean as possible, the exchange rate is excluded from the vector , as the transmission of 
monetary policy via the exchange rate is indirectly captured by the impulse responses of the 
VAR model. Explicit inclusion of the exchange rate would be necessary if this variable had 
influenced SNB behavior in a systematic way and, therefore, were required to identify a 
monetary policy shock. Exchange rate considerations played no important role for the bulk of 
the sample period, the exception being in particular the years 1978/79. Note that we do not 
select a monetary aggregate with a stable long-run money demand function in levels such as 
M3. We are only interested in a money stock concept providing a lot of information for the 
identification of a monetary policy shock. The monetary base was not used as the introduction 
of the electronic Swiss Interbank Clearing System and the relaxation of banks' liquidity 
requirements strongly distorted even the rates of change in this aggregate. However, we 
should also mention that the results are robust with respect to the in- or exclusion of the 
money stock series: a three variables VAR without money produces essentially the same 
shape of the impulse responses to the monetary policy shock as the four variable system. 
Finally, we ought to mention that the standard unit-root and co-integration tests support the 
first-difference specification adopted in this paper.
X
1  
                                                 
1 The results with respect to the interest rate are ambiguous: we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis (ADF test) 
as well as the stationarity hypothesis (KPSS test). Thus, we proceed on the I(1) hypothesis which is more 
convenient in our framework for identification of a monetary policy shock. Of course, this implies that the real 
rate of interest rate is non-stationary what is clearly doubtful in the long-run. However, for the medium-term 
forecasting horizon considered in this paper this assumption is deemed acceptable.  
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In this paper, long-run neutrality restrictions are used in order to identify structural 
shocks with variances normalized to 1. Briefly, we have the following interpretation of the 
four identified shocks. First, there is a supply shock which can either have a long-run effect 
on all four variables considered. Second, we have an IS shock which may have a permanent 
effect on all variables except for output. Third, there is a money demand shock which affects 
only the real money stock and prices in the long run. Fourth and most importantly in our 
framework, we identify a money supply or monetary policy shock which has only a long-run 
effect on prices (and, of course on the nominal money stock). These six long-run triangularity 
restrictions lead to an exactly identified model.2
All variables included in the model are seasonally adjusted with the exception of the 
interest rate. The lag length k was set to five quarters, which is the optimal value according to 
the Akaike criterion. Figure 1 shows the estimates for the cumulated impulse responses of the 
four variables to all four shocks.3 In the first column we find the responses of all variables (in 
the order they appear in the vector ) to the supply shock. Then, we have the responses to 
the IS-shock, to the money demand shock, and finally in the last column the response to the 
monetary policy shock which is of most importance in the current context. By and large, the 
latter response estimates correspond to the views shared by most macroeconomists in 
Switzerland about the effects of monetary policy. First, there is evidence of a short-run 
negative liquidity effect on the interest rate extending over two quarters. The positive reaction 
in real GDP starts weakly and reaches its peak after five quarters and starts to peter out after 
another year. With respect to prices, it takes six quarters until a major positive effect is felt 
and 14 quarters are needed for full adjustment of prices. After about the fourth quarter, rising 
prices and inflation expectations cause the interest rate to overshoot temporarily its long-run 
equilibrium level. Finally, the real money stock remains constant over the long-run 
equilibrium level for a year and decreases to it over the next four quarters. Before turning to 
the analysis of monetary policy in this SVAR model, let us briefly mention that the impulse 
responses to the other three shocks are in line with our priors from economic theory. In 
particular, we find a permanent positive (negative) effect of the supply shock on the 
production (prices) and the IS shock leads to a hump-shaped transitory response of production 
extending over 10 quarters which is accompanied by a permanent increase in the price level. 
X
                                                 
2 In earlier papers mentioned in the introduction we used an over-identified SVAR model including short-run 
restrictions. The over-identifying restrictions do not change essentially the results obtained in this paper since 
that SVAR model produces similar impulse responses for the monetary shock. However, the other shocks are 
easier to interpret in the current version of the model. 
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Alternative strategies for Swiss monetary policy can now be analyzed by deriving 
conditional forecasts from the SVAR model. Specifically, we determine a sequence of policy 
shocks required to satisfy such conditions as an average inflation target over a two- or three-
year period. Before we turn to this exercise in detail, we have to discuss briefly the 
appropriateness of our approach. It might be argued that the change in the SNB's monetary 
regime, as outlined above, invalidates the use of a model fitted to data generated by a different 
monetary environment. However, we believe that this problem is not of paramount 
importance in the present context. Price stability remained the ultimate objective of Swiss 
monetary policy throughout the sample period. Moreover, although the SNB adjusted its 
operating procedures at the end of 1999, this modification did not cause a break in the time 
series process of the variables considered in our SVAR model: Bank reserves, used as the 
main policy instrument before 1999, and the interest rate on repos, the principal new 
instrument, are not included in our VAR system. 
 Now let us briefly outline the approach developed by Kugler, Jordan, Lenz and Savioz 
(2005) for the analysis of forward looking monetary policy. Consider a monetary policy 
strategy based on an average inflation forecast for the next K quarters as it is applied in 
Switzerland. Take the example of a monetary policy reacting symmetrically to positive and 
negative deviations from the inflation target *π  measured at a quarterly rate. In this 
framework policy is directed by the expected deviation, as of time t, of the average inflation 
from its target for horizon K 
 )loglog(*),( tKttp ppEKtKd −−= +π ,                (1) 
where . ...),|()( 1,, −++ = ttKtiTKtit xxxExE
Next, we have to determine the sequence of monetary shocks from t+1 to t+K that 
leads to an expected average inflation which is equal to the target *π . In Switzerland 
monetary policy decisions have to be made given last period values for CPI inflation and 
money growth but only a first estimate of GDP growth for the last few quarters. This situation 
thus differs from the usual assumption in theoretical models that monetary policy can react to 
current period final values of inflation and output. There is an infinite number of ways to 
calculate these shocks. Leeper and Zha (1999) show that policy shocks in VAR-models have 
to be modest and least disturbing in order not to violate the validity of the simulations. We 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 No confidence intervals are given in Figure 1. Jordan, Kugler, Lenz and Savioz (2002) show that the effects of 
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therefore minimize the sum of the squared shocks subject to the restriction so that the average 
inflation rate is on target. As shown by Jordan, Kugler, Lenz and Savioz (2005) this leads to 
the following sequence of policy shocks  
),(),(
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44
44
4 tKdgtKd
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iKAAu ppipK
j
it =−= ∑−
=
+ .    (2) 
AA (j) is the 4x4 matrix of the impulse response, cumulated over j periods. Thus, the 
element 4,4 of this matrix gives the j period cumulated response of inflation to a monetary 
shock In the remainder of the paper, we call a rule within our SVAR approach based 
exclusively on an inflation target a strategy of strict medium-term  inflation targeting.  
Of course, we can apply the same approach using the average output growth as a target 
of monetary policy. Assume that the targeted output growth rate is denoted by γ *. Again we 
define first the deviation of the unconditional forecast of the output growth from target K 
periods ahead: 
  )loglog(*),( tKtty yyEKtKd −−= +γ                         (3) 
The application of the same procedure as applied for inflation provides us with the following 
 optimal (in the least squares sense) policy shocks for t+1 to t+K: 
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In what follows, we call a rule within our SVAR approach based exclusively output 
growth target a strategy of strict medium-term output growth targeting. 
Now let us consider the trade-off faced by monetary policy in the framework of our 
SVAR model. To this end, we consider the variability of inflation and output growth implied 
by different degrees of medium-term inflation and output growth targeting over the K-period 
horizon. To start with, we define a convex combination of the monetary policy shocks for 
strict medium-term inflation or output growth targeting given in equations (2) and (4): 
                                                                                                                                                        
the monetary policy shocks in an overidentified variant of the model are statistically significant. 
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KitKdgtKdgu yyippiit ,,1),,()1(),(4 K=−+=+ αα       (5) 
This is the situation of a monetary policy board, where the decision is taken by 
consensus and according to the average preferences of its members. The board members have 
either the preference for pure inflation targeting or pure output growth targeting in the 
medium term. The parameter α thus reflects the fraction of the inflation hawks in the board 
and α−1  is the fraction of the inflation doves. Of course for 1α =  we have the case of strict 
medium-term inflation targeting and for 0α =  we follow a strict medium-term output growth 
targeting. This strategy corresponds to the goal of minimizing the weighted sum of the 
conditional variability of the expected medium term inflation and growth rate. 
The proposed formalization of the monetary policy strategy is appropriate in the sense 
that it captures very well the focus of medium term orientation of Swiss monetary policy on 
inflation and GDP growth perspectives. Indeed, our experience tells us that the discussion 
about Swiss monetary policy exactly focuses on medium term inflation and GDP growth 
outlook and a main issue is how much a GDP growth target should be taken into account. 
However, our framework for monetary policy analysis differs from the two approaches 
usually adopted in the literature, namely the Taylor rule and the optimizing framework. It may 
be argued that our framework lies somehow between these two approaches. Equation (5) 
shares some feature with the Taylor rule framework: it implies, for instance, a negative value 
for the monetary policy shock when the medium term inflation forecast and/or GDP growth 
forecast is above target which leads to an increase in the interest rate. The weights α and 1-α 
play a similar role as the coefficients of the inflation and output gap term in a Taylor rule, 
respectively. By contrast to an ad hoc Taylor rule, the policy reaction in our framework aims 
at a medium-term target taking fully into account the expected dynamic effects according to a 
fully specified empirical model. This feature of our model is shared with the optimizing 
framework. However, the latter is more general in the sense that a discounted weighted 
average of all future expected inflation and output variability is taken into account. With our 
approach policy makers are more “simple minded” as they care only about conditional 
medium term inflation and GDP growth volatility. 
Another modeling issue is raised by the Lucas critique.  Of course, our approach 
would be invalid if we considered changes in α as regime changes. We argue in a similar way 
against this possible objection as we did before when we briefly addressed the question of 
using data from a period of monetary targeting to estimate a model used for the analysis of 
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forecast oriented monetary policy. We see “regime changes” as fundamental new orientations 
of the goals of monetary policy as the transition from an environment of high and volatile 
inflation to a policy of keeping inflation low as many countries experienced in the last 15 
years. In our model inflation always returns to its long-run equilibrium irrespective of the 
value adopted for α. We consider such changes therefore as “modest” and non-fundamental as 
the low inflation environment prevailing in Switzerland since the mid-seventies is preserved.  
Now let us see to what extent the planned sequence of monetary policy shocks is able 
to close the deviation of average inflation and output growth rate from their targets. The 
remaining gaps  and  (measured as deviation from target) corresponds to the 
impact of the policy shocks minus the forecasted deviation from target  and  
induced by the three non-policy shocks at time t. The cumulated impulse response function 
leads to the following deviations for inflation (rp) and GDP growth (ry) from target, 
respectively (Kugler, Jordan, Lenz and Savioz, 2005): 
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   For the economic interpretation of the two expressions derived above, we briefly 
consider for example the (expected) response of the medium term inflation rate to the 
forecast-oriented monetary policy. If α  is equal to one (strict medium-term inflation 
targeting), we expect to hit the average inflation target exactly and the gap  is zero. 
Otherwise the medium term deviation of inflation from target is determined by the expression 
in brackets . The second term of this expression reflects the influence 
of the reaction of monetary policy to the output growth target, which depends on the deviation 
Ktrp +
)],(),([ tKdGtKd yyp −
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from the output target  and the parameter which measures the co-movement of output 
and prices in reaction to a monetary policy shock.  
yd yG
The deviation of the K-period ahead average inflation and output growth from target is 
revised in period t according to the shocks hitting the economy. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that we are in equilibrium in time 1−t  in the sense that we expect to hit both targets 
in the period t to 1−+ Kt  and correspondingly the monetary policy shock in period t is zero. 
However, the non-policy shock of period t leads to deviations from the targets, which in turn 
needs a revision of the planned monetary policy shock sequence. We first note that the 
deviations of the unconditional forecasts from their targets are given by: 
)9())0()((),(
)8())0()((),(
4
11
4
44
∑
∑
≠
≠
−−=
−−=
l
ltlly
l
ltllp
uAAKAAtKd
uAAKAAtKd
 
Note that the structural shocks have an impact effect on inflation and output growth which has 
to be subtracted as it has no influence on future inflation and growth. Substituting these 
expressions into equation (6) and (7), respectively we get 
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Calculating conditional variances (given information of time t) provides the following 
expressions:  
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This implies a linear trade-off in the standard deviations of the output growth and inflation 
medium-term responses. Of course, this conditional variance is zero for inflation (output 
growth) when α is 1 (0), otherwise both variances are larger than zero. The reader has to be 
reminded that these conditional variances are with respect to the K-period ahead expected 
values in t.           
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3. The Effect of GDP Revision Errors on Inflation and Growth Rate 
Volatility  
In this section we analyze the effects of GDP revision errors on monetary policy 
induced volatility of inflation and growth. For CPI inflation, data revision errors are not a 
serious problem given the fact that these data are available on a monthly basis practically 
without delay and are hardly ever revised. The same applies to money stock data which are 
only subject to minor revisions. However, data revision errors are clearly a problem for 
output: Two months after the end of a quarter a first GDP estimate is released. In September 
of year t these figures for the preceding year are revised when they are adjusted to the first 
release annual GDP data for the preceding year. The annual account of year t-1 is itself 
subject to revisions which are published in September of year t+1 and which lead to a second 
revision of quarterly GDP figures of year t-1. Moreover, the changes in the base year of the 
account in 1989 and 1997 lead to additional differences between the final series available 
today and the real time data of before 19964. This timing of data revisions implies that real 
time forecast in our VAR with lag length five have to be based on preliminary GPD figures  
which are all subject to revisions.  
The first release quarterly GDP figures are based on a regression of annual GDP on 
annual data of quarterly available production indicators taking into account first order 
autoregression of the residuals. After annual data became available the difference between the 
annual figure and the sum of the quarterly first release figures is distributed to the quarterly 
data taking into account the autocorrelation of the residuals of the regression equation (Chow 
and Lin, 1971).   
Swiss Quarterly GDP data are released regularly with a two months delay since 1980 
when for the first time an official historical quarterly account going back to the mid-sixties 
was published. The difference (expressed in percentage points) between the final 1990 base 
year figure and the first release is plotted in Figure 2. The GDP data revision error appears as 
a highly volatile and strongly positively autocorrelated but stationary time series with a mean 
close to zero. Indeed a standard unit root test clearly rejects the null hypothesis and an AR(1) 
model with a coefficient close to 0.8 fits the data well. The estimates of the mean, which is 
 10
not significantly different from zero, and the standard deviation are –0.13 and 1.16, 
respectively. The standard deviation for the data revision error of the growth rate of GDP, 
which is relevant in our VAR in first differences, is 0.81. Moreover, there is some slight 
negative autocorrelation which is not statistically significant and which can be neglected for 
practical purposes.5 Before turning to the effects of these data revision errors on the volatility 
trade-off between inflation and GDP growth, we have to briefly discuss the high persistence 
of the data revision errors documented above. At first sight this seems to indicate that the first 
releases of the GDP figures are sub-optimal estimates. However, such a conclusion is not 
warranted for the following reason: the revision of the quarterly GDP figures within the 
framework of the Chow and Lin method leads by construction to autocorrelated revision 
errors.  Moreover,  a change in the base year when new annual figures for many previous 
years become available leads to persistent revision errors. 
This GDP revision error has an influence on growth and inflation forecasts, which 
depend on n (equal to the VAR lag length minus one) lagged noisy growth rates in our VAR 
framework. The easiest way to calculate the effect of the data revision errors on these 
forecasts is based on the reduced form vector moving average representation of the time t+i 
(i=1,2….,K) value of the vector X defined in section 2:  
.....)(...)1()(.....)1( 11 +−++−++++= −−−+++ ntttititit eniCeiCeiCeCeX    (14) 
The data revision error in GDP growth (the first element of the vector X) in time t, say 
, can be interpreted as a change in the first element of reduced form error e in time t and 
has, therefore, the effect   on the GDP growth forecast made in t, where  is the 
element 1,1 of the reduced form impulse response matrix C(i). Similarly the effect on the 
inflation forecast is . If the data revision error is dated time t-j the corresponding effects 
are . In our framework we are interested in the cumulated effect of the data 
revision errors on the inflation and output growth forecast up to K periods, which are given by 
tv
)(11 iC )(11 iC
)(41 iC
)4,1(),(1 =− ljiCl
                                                                                                                                                        
4 These base year changes include conceptual changes in the annual account, in particular in 1996. However, we 
think that these changes also have to be accounted for as they should result in better GDP data which were 
calculated back to 1980 and which were used for the estimation of the model. 
5  The first order autocorrelation coefficient is –0.3.  
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The current data revision error has a special effect on the forecasted target deviation of 
output as it effects the period t as well as the expected period t+K value log output in equation 
(3). This explains the subtraction of 1 in the first term of the second equation given above. 
Let us now consider the data revision induced expected deviations from the inflation 
and growth target rep and rey, respectively. Monetary policy reacts to these deviations 
according to equation (5) given in Section 2, where d-terms are replaced by de-terms given in 
equations (15) and (16): 
         KitKdegtKdegu yyippiit ,,1),,()1(),(4 K=−+=+ αα      (17) 
Therefore, the expected deviation from target of inflation and growth after the (error) 
induced policy reaction are given by  
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 The evaluation of these expressions - analogous to the derivation of equations (6) and 
(7) in Section 2 – leads to the following two equations: 
),()1(),( tKdeGtKderep yypKt αα −+=+        (20) 
),()1(),( tKdetKdeGrey yppKt αα −+=+        (21) 
Accordingly, we get the following expressions for the conditional (given time t 
information) variances for these data revision error induced changes: 
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The covariance matrix of the data revision error induced deviations from target is easily 
obtained as follows: These two variables can be written as a linear transformation of the n 
relevant error terms collected in a Vector V, namely DV. The elements of the 2xn matrix D are 
obtained by the reduced form impulse responses as given above. Thus, the covariance matrix 
of the two deviations is  where the covariance matrix of V [ ] is 
approximately diagonal, given the approximate white noise property of the data revision error. 
Therefore, the (reduced form) impulse response estimate of our SVAR model and the 
variance for the data revision error allow the calculation of the variances and the covariance 
of the two target deviations.  
')( DVDCov )(VCov
In Figures 3 and 4 the inflation and the output growth variance caused by the data 
revision error and the induced policy reaction is plotted as function of α  for  (which is 
favorable to output growth targeting as the effect of monetary policy on output at this horizon 
is relatively strong) and n = 4, which is the relevant number of lagged data revision errors in 
our VAR model with lag length 5. We can see that the minimum variance in both cases is 
now obtained with a value of α approximately equal to 0.75. The declining segments of these 
graphs are brought about by the fact that the reduced form impulse response of inflation to a 
reduced form shock in output growth is relatively weak compared to that of output growth 
itself. The slight increase of the data revision error induced variability is caused by the 
negative correlation between responses of cumulated growth and inflation. The loss of this 
“diversification” effect leads to an increase in both variances when the weight of the strict 
medium-term inflation target gets extreme. However, note that the existence of data revision 
errors in GDP growth favor a higher weight for the strict medium-term inflation target.  
8K =
Figure 5 includes 2 scatterplots for different values of α  adopting a 8 quarters horizon 
K. The first refers to the conditional variance of output growth and inflation due to the 
occurrence of structural shocks as described in section 2 (equations 12 and 13). However, the 
findings are robust with respect to reasonable changes of the target horizon for the conduct of 
monetary policy (two to three and a half years). We can see from Figure 5 that our SVAR 
model implies a standard convex efficiency frontier for the conditional variances of inflation 
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and growth. Tolerating a higher variability of output growth allows for a lower variability of 
inflation and vice versa (trade-off). Thereby, the maximum variability of inflation is clearly 
higher than the maximum variability of output growth. This result is caused by the higher 
persistence of the impact of the shocks on inflation than on growth. The second scatterplot 
adds the variance due to data revision errors. We note that there is no longer a convex 
efficiency frontier if data revision errors in GDP are taken into account: Decreasing the 
weight of output growth targeting over some range, i.e., increasing α  from 0 to 
approximately 0.42, decreases the conditional variance of both inflation and growth. Thus, 
there is no trade-off between smaller output growth variance and higher inflation variance 
over this range. This result is due to the fact that with data revision errors, monetary policy 
reacts too much to noisy data if the weight on output growth targeting becomes too big. This 
occurs because the data revision error has a strong impact on the growth forecast but not on 
the inflation forecast. However, if 85.0>α  this effect is slightly out-weighted by a loss of 
“diversification” which is brought about by the negative correlation of the data revision error 
induced responses of medium term inflation and growth. 
 The non-convex efficiency frontier is an empirical result, but the same phenomenon 
may arise in a standard New-Keynesian model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) when the 
central bank reacts to noisy output gap data. The corresponding analysis is briefly presented 
in an appendix to this paper. Of course this raises the question why the central bank does not 
account for the errors in the GDP data in its policy by constructing an optimal estimate of 
GDP given all available information. Our approach can be defended against this objection by 
two arguments: first, the quarterly GDP figures released by the statistical office should be a 
“best” estimate using all quarterly available production, employment and survey information. 
Thus, it is not easy to argue that the central bank is able to provide better quarterly GDP 
estimates.  Second, even if the central bank could produce better GDP estimates it would be 
very difficult to communicate monetary policy decision relying on GDP figures which are 
different from the official data provided by the government’s statistical office.  Such an 
approach would obviously lead to credibility problems for the central bank. Note that for the 
output gap this problem does not arise, as there is no official figures released for this variable 
and the central bank has the freedom to produce its own estimate. In sum we believe that the 
central bank has to base its policy on the officially released GDP figures when it adopts a 
GDP growth target.  
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4. Non-Equilibrium Initial Conditions and Policy Dynamics 
 
So far we have focussed our analysis on the effects of time t structural shocks on the 
time t expected (conditional) volatility of the K-period ahead expected inflation and growth 
rate given long-run equilibrium in the past in the sense that we assume that all shocks dated 
earlier than t are zero. The results obtained under this assumption may differ from those for 
the unconditional variance of medium-term inflation and growth for two reasons: first, there is 
no long-run equilibrium in the past and past shocks influence current and future outcomes.  
Second the realized period t+K outcome depends, of course, also on the shocks and policy 
decisions in the period t+1, t+2,…, t+K which depend on the future medium-term inflation 
and growth forecasts. Moreover, future policy decisions are influenced by current policy 
decisions which do not only have  an effect on  average inflation and growth up to t+K but 
also affect time t+K+1, t+K+2,…, outcomes. 
 
In order to investigate the effects of different monetary policy strategies on the 
unconditional variance of medium-term inflation and growth, we use a simulation approach. 
We take the history of the three structural shocks from 1982 to 2002 and the initial conditions 
in 1980/81 as given and simulate the development of the four variables of our SVAR model 
under the assumption that the monetary policy shocks are generated according to Equation (5) 
for different values of α and using historical averages as inflation and growth targets6. The 
counterfactual series obtained in this way are then used to calculate the variance of medium-
term inflation and growth (the sample variance of the generated series ) for varying 
values of α. The generation of the forecasts guiding monetary policy is done firstly by 
neglecting the GDP revision errors and secondly by using the real time data. The scatter 
diagrams obtained from these simulations are displayed in Figure 6. 
gg
tKt
xx −+
 
Figure 6 differs from Figure 5 with two respects: first, the unconditional variance is 
substantially (nearly ten times) higher than the time t variance. Second, the efficiency frontier 
is no longer convex but slightly concave in the unconditional case without data revision 
errors. This result is brought about by a differing shape of the dependence of the inflation and 
growth variance on α. The variance of inflation (growth) decreases (increases) with α at a 
decreasing rate. Therefore, lowering the ouput (inflation) weight in a situation of strict 
medium-term growth (inflation) targeting leads to a strong (weak) reduction of growth 
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(inflation) variance. The first difference is easy to explain since not only current (time t) 
shocks are taken into account but also past and future (up to time t+K) shocks are accounted 
for. The non-convex shape of the is basically explained by the fact that in our framework 
monetary policy  aims at a low ex ante variability of the time t expected medium term growth 
and inflation rate and not at the ex post variability of these series. The unconditional variance 
depends in a much more complex way on α than the variance of the time t expected variances 
given in Section 2. In order to see this complexity it is helpful to consider first the 
unconditional (no initial equilibrium) deviations from targets which are given by the 
following equations: 
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The first term in the two equations above gives the effect of past structural and policy shocks 
on the forecast deviations from target in t+1. Under the initial equilibrium assumption these 
expressions reduce to (8) and (9) as only the time t structural shocks are different from zero. 
When these equations are combined with (5) for i equal to 1, 
),()1(),( 1114 tKdgtKdgu yyppt αα −+=+ , we see that we generate an autoregressive 
dependence of the policy shock:  
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The AR coefficients depend on the K period differences of the cumulated impulse 
responses of inflation and growth, the weight of strict medium-term inflation targeting and the 
t+1 policy response under strict medium-term inflation and growth targeting. As the 
difference of the cumulated inflation impulse response is always positive, we have a negative 
AR dependence (positive) in the case of strict medium-term inflation (growth) targeting7. To 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The values are 2.4 and 1.4 percent per annum for inflation and growth, respectively. 
7 Note that the differing sizes of the cumulated impulse responses of inflation and growth are approximately 
compensated by different value of the g-coefficient which is close to 1/3 and 3/4 for inflation and growth, 
respectively.  
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understand this result intuitively, consider a currently expansive monetary policy which leads 
to an increase in output which is reversed after seven quarters. The reversion of the policy 
effect calls for an expansionary policy in the future in order to hit the growth target. 
Therefore, strict medium-term growth targeting can generate self-enforcing policy actions. 
The same story applies to policy actions to current IS and money demand shocks which have 
the same hump-shaped cumulated response pattern of GDP growth. This effect plays no role 
for strict medium-term inflation targeting, as we have a permanent effect of all shocks on the 
price level which is reached smoothly over time. 
The arguments outlined above indicate that there is a difference between the trade-off 
in the dynamic context considered in this section and the trade-off in the “static” context of 
Section 2. In the fully dynamic context, large (small) reductions in inflation variability always 
have to be paid more or less by large (small) increases in GDP growth variability. The second 
scatter plot of Figure 6 shows that the dynamic effects of the GDP-data revision error lead to 
an even more pronounced non-standard efficiency frontier. It has an increasing branch for α 
between  0.45 and 1. This result is brought about by the strong influence of the data revision 
errors on the GDP forecasts and the implied policy reaction which creates higher inflation and 
GDP growth variability. This effect out-weighs the small reduction in growth rate variability 
caused by the decrease  of α. For values of α smaller than 0.45, the impact of a lower α  
dominates the impact of data revision errors and thus leads to a strong reduction of growth 
variability. However, most of this branch is not feasible as the assumption of moderate policy 
intervention is clearly no longer appropriate. These outcomes require monetary policy shocks 
that are clearly positive on average and thus invalidate our analysis. In other words, with 
values of α smaller than 0.3, simulated average inflation rate is between 0.5 to 1.5 percent 
points per annum above its historical value8. Therefore, the consideration of GDP data 
revision errors in our fully dynamic context sharpens our policy conclusion of Section 3  
strongly in the sense that strict-medium term inflation targeting is suggested as a strategy to 
get inflation and growth variability as low as possible. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 It should be stressed that for all other simulations we get average monetary policy shocks which are essentially 
0 and therefore average simulated inflation rates which are very close to the historical average. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed forward-looking rules for Swiss monetary policy in a small 
structural VAR consisting of four variables in the presence of GDP revision errors. There are 
two main results of the paper. First, if data revision errors in GDP are taken into account, 
there is no longer a convex efficiency frontier between the conditional variance of medium-
term inflation and GDP growth: Increasing the weight of the output growth target )1( α−  
from 0.58 to 1 increases the conditional variance of both medium-term expected inflation and 
growth. This result is due to the fact that with, data revision errors, monetary policy reacts too 
strongly to noisy data if the weight on output growth targeting becomes too big, as data 
revision errors have a strong impact on the growth forecast but not on the inflation forecast. 
However, if 82.0>α , this effect is slightly out-weighted by a loss of “diversification” which 
is brought about by the negative correlation of the policy reaction to data revision error 
induced responses of medium-term inflation and growth. Therefore, a strict medium-term 
inflation strategy is inefficient even if the costs of increased volatility of inflation and growth 
compared to the case 82.0=α  are relatively small. 
The second result shows that this effect of data revision error is reinforced when non-
equilibrium initial conditions and the consequences of endogenous policy dynamics are taken 
into account. In fact, in the presence of GDP data revision errors, policy reactions to the 
inflation and growth consequences of past policy decisions may even destabilize the economy 
if the weight on the medium-term GDP growth target is high. In general, the paper indicates 
that under realistic assumptions the central bank induces a higher variability of both output 
growth and inflation by concentrating too strongly on output growth. The existence of data 
revision errors for GDP forcefully underline the limits and the risks of a monetary policy 
aiming at output stabilization. Even if the central bank only cares about growth stabilization, 
the weight on this target relative to the one of the inflation target should be clearly smaller 
than 1 or even zero. Thus, our results confirm the concerns about output growth stabilization 
first raised by Orphanides (2000) when real time data problems and are taken into account. In 
addition our findings are in line with the theoretical analysis of Gaspar and Vestin (2004) who 
consider a non-optimizing policy maker following reasonable policy precepts in a standard 
new Keynesian model with uncertainty about the output gap.   
The results of the paper can also be linked to the literature on time-inconsistency of 
monetary policy of the type introduced by Barro and Gordon (1983) and Kydland and 
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Prescott (1977).9 In a seminal paper Rogoff (1985) showed in this context that delegating 
monetary policy to a conservative central banker, i.e. a central banker who is relatively more 
concerned about inflation than the society as a whole, can decrease the variance of both 
inflation and output growth and thereby improve the welfare of the society. In our model, 
time-inconsistency is not a problem. However, we can interpret α  as the fraction of inflation 
hawks in a central bank board. Thus, even if the society had strong preference of output 
stabilization, i.e. if α  is 0, it would be an advantage for the society to appoint a conservative 
board with a α  clearly bigger than 0. Such a board may deliver a smaller variability of output 
growth than a board that reflects exactly the preferences of the public. Consequently, our 
results support the view that the government should appoint conservative central bankers 
when it is politically difficult to motivate a downgrading of the medium term GDP growth 
target by data revision problems for GDP.  
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Appendix: GDP Revision Errors in a Simple Theoretical Model  
Let us consider the standard New Keynesian model discussed in the survey paper of 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). It consists of IS-curve, a "new" Phillips curve and a 
quadratic loss function in inflation π and growth or output gap x of the central bank, which 
operates by setting the nominal interest rate i 
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where g and u are zero mean structural shocks which follow an AR(1) process with 
coefficient µ and ρ, respectively.  
In this model optimal monetary policy under discretion is characterized by the 
following first order condition 
tt a
x πλ−=            (A2) 
implying that demand is contracted by increasing (decreasing) the interest rate when inflation 
is above (below) target which is supposed to be zero. Now let us assume that the central bank 
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observes x only with a zero mean data revision error e which follows an AR(1) process with 
coefficient θ. Therefore, the first order condition fulfilled by the central bank, which neglects 
this data revision problem, is 
 ttt a
ex πλ−=+           (A3) 
Inserting the optimality condition in the Phillips curve results in 
tttttt uEea
+++−= +1)( πβπλλπ  
The model solution is a linear function of the two state variables u and e with unknown coefficients: 
ttt eu 21 φφπ +=           (A4) 
According to the assumed AR(1) structure, the expected value for t+1 is equal to 
tttt euE θφρφπ 211 +=+  
Inserting these expressions in the first equation provides 
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Equating coefficients on both sides of this equation results in 
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Inserting the solution for π in the optimality condition easily results in the solution for x  and we get 
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This means that a positive data revision error (growth is deemed to be higher by the 
central bank than it really is) leads to a too restrictive monetary policy resulting in lower 
growth and lower inflation. Under the (reasonable) assumption that u and e are not correlated 
we have the following expressions for the variances of inflation and growth 
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where σ is the standard deviation of the variable indicated by the lower case letter. When 
there is no data revision error these expressions imply the standard convex policy efficiency 
frontier in the variance of growth and inflation which is obtained by varying α  from zero to 
infinity as discussed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler. However, this convexity may be destroyed 
by the introduction of the GDP data revision error as monetary policy reacts on noisy output 
data. It can be easily seen from the above expressions that the contribution of the data revision 
error to the variance of inflation increases with α  for both variables. Therefore, increasing a 
definitely increases the variance of inflation but the effect on the variance of growth is 
ambiguous: on the one hand the effect of the structural shock and the corresponding 
variability decreases. On the other hand the effect of the data revision error on output and 
correspondingly its variability increases. Which of these two effects dominates particularly 
depends on the relative magnitude of the variance of the structural shock and the data revision 
error.  
Figure 1: Accumulated impulse responses of changes in log GDP, interest rate (3M-SFR- 
LIBOR), log real money stock (M1) and log prices (CPI) to structural shock, SVAR(5), 
quarterly data 1974/I-2002/IV 
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of GDP (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit supply shock in quarter 1
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of GDP (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit IS shock in quarter 1
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of GDP (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit M1-demand shock in quarter 1
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of GDP (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit monetary  policy shock in quarter 1
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LIBOR (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit supply shock in quarter 1
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LIBOR(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit IS shock in quarter 1
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LIBOR(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit M1-demand shock in quarter 1
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LIBOR(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit monetary  policy shock in quarter 1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of real M1(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit supply shock in quarter 1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of real M1(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit IS shock in quarter 1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of real M1(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit M1-demand shock in quarter 1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of real M1(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit monetary  policy shock in quarter 1
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of CPI (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit supply shock in quarter 1
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of CPI (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit IS shock in quarter 1
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of CPI(percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit M1-demand shock in quarter 1
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of CPI (percent) over 16 quarters
to a unit monetary  policy shock in quarter 1
 
 
 22
Figure 2: Data revision errors of quarterly Swiss GDP, 1980-2002 
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Figure 3: 8-quarters-ahead conditional variance of inflation caused by data revision 
errors of GDP 
Inflation measured in percent, ALPHA is the weight of medium term inflation target 
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Figure 4: 8-quarters-ahead conditional variance of output growth caused by data 
revision errors of GDP 
Output growth measured in percent, ALPHA is the weight of medium term inflation target 
 
 
 
Figure 5: 8-quarters-ahead conditional variance of inflation and output growth trade-off 
Structural shocks (dashed line) as well as structural shocks with varying α and data revision errors 
(solid line), inflation and output growth measured in percent; alpha is the weight of medium term 
inflation target 
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Figure 6: 8-quarters-ahead unconditional variance of inflation and output growth 
trade-off 
Historical structural shocks and simulated monetary policy with varying α (dashed line) as well as 
GDP data revision errors (solid line), inflation and output growth measured in percent; alpha is the 
weight of medium term inflation target 
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